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European Integration and Anti-Money 
Laundering Cooperation
Allison Blauvelt
American University
Abstract
This paper compares European Union anti-money laundering (AML) efforts with in-
ternational efforts in scope and intensity through an analysis of the timeline of AML coop-
eration in Europe from 1980 to 2012, showing the creation or adoption date for relevant or-
ganizations and legislation, referred to as actions. The actors include United Nations bodies, 
the Financial Action Task Force, the Council of Europe, and European Union bodies. This 
paper also comments on the utility of different European Union (EU) integration theories 
in explaining the patterns in cooperation. The key finding of this paper is that international 
AML cooperation operates in waves, with the EU riding, instead of leading, each wave. The 
realist proposition that cooperation among the member states of the EU is limited to low-
risk and high-gain projects best explains this pattern. However, the EU rear-guard position 
may be due to other factors, such as specific and lengthy legislative processes.
Keywords
Money Laundering, Crime, Integration Theory
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Money laundering has important external and internal security implications for states 
because it aids criminals, benefits terrorists, and drains public and private funds that could 
otherwise be used for defense or under-funded programs. This paper aims to analyze anti-
money laundering institutions in Europe and thus to contribute to the discourse on Euro-
pean Union integration. We would expect to see cooperation among integrated states due 
to the transnational nature of money laundering, but this paper finds that the EU follows 
cues from international actors. Mapping out anti-money laundering cooperation in Europe 
could help determine which European Union integration theories are most useful as tools 
for explaining EU member state action in this area. 
Money laundering helps criminals utilize their ill-gotten gains by making their crimi-
nal profits appear legitimate. Increased criminal success endangers internal security and state 
control. Terrorists and insurgents sometimes disguise their sources of funding, which in 
turn makes these decentralized groups harder to track. Terrorism is an internal and external 
security threat. Additionally, money laundering and tax evasion represent a loss of revenue 
to the state, which may in turn threaten a state’s defense budget and capacity, inherently 
reducing its security. 
Globalization has led to an increase in money laundering in the last few decades. As 
economies and financial systems become more integrated, regulation increasingly pushes 
this illegal activity offshore instead of eliminating it. Additionally, new technologies of mo-
bile banking have increased the speed and ease of international transactions and can interfere 
with customer identification demands and regulations. The UN Office on Drugs and Crime 
makes clear that globalization makes the office’s job more difficult. 
A number of developments in the international financial system during recent decades 
have made the three F’s—finding, freezing and forfeiting of criminally derived income and 
assets—all the more difficult. These include the “dollarization” (i.e., the use of the United 
States dollar in transactions) of black markets, the general trend towards financial deregula-
tion, the progress of the European market and the proliferation of financial secrecy havens 
(“Money-Laundering and Globalization,” 2013).
Thus, one can extrapolate that as the pace of globalization accelerates, the difficulties 
in tracking money laundering across the world will also increase. This is especially true with 
the introduction of virtual currencies such as BitCoin. An official at the Office of Foreign 
Assets Control (OFAC) recently indicated that agencies such as OFAC find dealing with or 
regulating virtual currencies increasingly challenging. The official said that since the tech-
nology is new, it is hard to find experts on the subject (“Personal Interview with Official of 
Office of Foreign Assets Control, US Department of Treasury. Washington D.C.,” 2013). 
However, the official admitted that the focus is still hard currency laundering.
Regions of further integration may feel the effects disproportionately. In Europe, the 
introduction of the Eurozone, compounded with that of the Schengen zone, has made it 
easier for criminals and their proceeds to move from state to state, evading justice and/or 
choosing states with the most lenient regulations. Thus, EU member states have an interest 
in harmonizing their anti-money laundering (AML) efforts in the region. 
Literature Review
The extensive scholarship on European Union integration can be simplified into sev-
eral groups of theories, notably neo-functionalism, liberal intergovernmentalism (loosely 
related to neo-liberalism), and bureaucratic path dependency. Realists traditionally have had 
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less to say on the topic, since they see integration as an ephemeral phenomenon, a reflection 
of balance of power politics. 
Neo-functionalism
Neo-functionalists believe cooperation on any issue is natural when interests converge, 
no matter where the issue ranks in importance on the agenda. The famous neo-functionalist 
Ernst Haas claimed that the main drivers of integration were positive spillover, the transfer 
of domestic allegiances and technocratic automaticity, not historical circumstances specific 
to post-war Europe (Haas, 1958, 1961). Neo-functionalists would expect to see coopera-
tion on money laundering because it represents a spillover from monetary integration. They 
would see collaboration over money laundering as a driver of integration because it rein-
forces habits of cooperation. 
Bureaucratic Path Dependency
Bureaucratic path dependency theorists such as Karen Alter suggest that although in-
ternational organizations are created by states, they sometimes take on lives of their own. 
Alter would highlight how an expanded mandate of the European Union would benefit 
EU bureaucrats and EU agency missions (Alter, 1998). Thus, she would predict coopera-
tion on money laundering and would see it as a byproduct/evidence of integration, not a 
driver itself.
Liberal Institutionalism/Intergovernmentalism
Scholars influenced by liberal institutionalism or intergovernmentalism, such as An-
drew Moravcsik, believe the main drivers of integration are commercial interests, states’ rel-
ative bargaining power, and incentives to enhance the credibility of interstate commitments.
(Alter, 1998) He would expect cooperation because anti-money-laundering is a commercial 
interest. Additionally, he would argue that AML collaboration sends a signal that a state is 
devoted to EU values, which helps reinforce the credibility of future promises.
Realism
Realists see cooperation as a reflection of the balance of power. They would expect the 
hegemon to coerce cooperation only if it had substantial gains from such actions. In the case 
of the EU, realists would thus expect Europe to take a lead only if France and Germany, the 
two backbone countries, had a strong interest in AML cooperation. 
The first three theories would predict more AML cooperation in the EU than is seen 
internationally. Realists would only predict such higher levels of integration if it were ap-
parent that the most powerful players in the EU were disproportionately affected by money 
laundering. 
Research Question
The first step to testing these theories in the context of anti-money laundering coop-
eration in Europe requires answering the following two questions: 
1) How do European Union anti-money laundering efforts compare with international ef-
forts in scope and intensity?
2) Does the EU cooperation precede or follow international action? 
Most scholars would predict that European AML efforts produce more thorough and 
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enforceable legislation, and that shared European interests allow member states to go fur-
ther and faster in their regulation. Neither neo-functionalism, nor intergovernmentalism, 
nor bureaucratic path dependency theory can adequately explain the conclusion that inter-
national AML legislation precedes and is more rigorous than European AML legislation. 
Although it appears that the realist argument can explain why European states do not go fur-
ther in this area, future study can tease out the finer points. One limitation of these questions 
is that the findings do not help determine whether this cooperation is a symptom or driver 
of European integration. This paper compares regional and international AML cooperation 
through the range of legislation and agencies with relevant mandates. This, in turn, ignores 
many of the nuances of de facto political power – not every agency matters, and not every 
law is followed. However, it is a good place to start. 
Explanatory Notes on Action Levels and Legislation Types
For the purposes of this research, actions, such as creating new legislation or a new 
monitoring body, and actors are divided into international and regional levels. Although 
these different types of actions have a variable and hard-to-measure impact, in this research, 
actions are important regardless of their force because any action signals a willingness to “do 
something” about AML. Differentiating between international and regional levels helps 
demonstrate which types of forums states prefer to work through. International actors are 
the United Nations bodies and the Financial Action Task Force. Regional actors are the 
Council of Europe and the European Union. 
The European Union is often discussed as if it is a single, unified actor, especially in the 
media. However, it is important to note that the EU is a conglomeration of different units 
and branches with varying missions that compete for resources and influence. The European 
Council, a summit of the heads of state or government of the member states, directs broad 
political goals. The Commission, representing the interests of the EU as a whole, proposes 
binding legislation. The Council of the EU, representing member state government minis-
ters, votes on Commission legislation and produces non-binding agreements. The European 
Parliament, which represents the people (and reflects their political party choices), also votes 
on Commission legislation. Even when a binding piece of legislation is passed within EU 
organs, it is not always ratified and fully implemented within member states. Thus, an “EU 
law” does not arise from some abstract unified European will. 
Additionally, “EU laws” encompass a wide variety of binding and non-binding agree-
ments. The most relevant legislation regarding anti-money laundering efforts include joint 
actions of the Council of the EU, a framework decision of the Council of the EU, and three 
directives. The directives were initiated by the European Commission and passed by the 
European Parliament and the Council of the EU. Before delving into these instruments, a 
brief explanation the Council of the EU’s role is necessary. 
Council of the European Union, European Council, and Council of Europe
The Council of the European Union should not be confused with either the European 
Council or the Council of Europe. The Council of the European Union, which in this pa-
per will be referred to in short-hand as the Council, is the EU body in which the national 
ministers from each EU country meet to coordinate policies and adopt laws. The specific 
minister that attends each meeting is determined by the topic at hand. Thus, the Council 
of the EU represents the interests of each member state in the field at hand. For example, 
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when discussing a general economic plan, the economic and finance ministers from each 
member state would attend. Justice and Interior ministers are responsible for coordinating 
policy and adopting legislation related to anti-money laundering and countering the finance 
of terrorism (AML/CFT) (Moravcsik, 1998). The Council of the EU can be thought of as 
“multiple councils.” 
The European Council is essentially a forum for the heads of state or government of 
the member states to decide broad political priorities and to address matters too sensitive to 
leave to lower-level ministers. However, the European Council has no power to pass laws. 
The Council of Europe is not a body of the European Union. The Council of Europe, 
which in this paper will be referred to in shorthand as the CoE, is a separate organization 
with a more inclusive membership that aims to promote cooperation and shared values 
across the European continent. The Council of Europe has a separate set of conventions and 
standard-setting bodies that will be addressed later in the paper. 
The Council of the EU approves the budget, a powerful tool, but does not have the 
right to initiate legislation. The relevant minister from the country who holds the presi-
dency of the EU chairs the different Council meetings. An exception is made for the foreign 
ministers council, whose permanent chairperson is the EU’s High Representative for For-
eign and Security Policy. Although the chairperson does not receive special voting rights, 
he or she can still guide the policy agenda. The current High Representative is Baroness 
Catherine Ashton (UK). She assumed office on December 1, 2009, and will hold the po-
sition through October 31, 2014. Italy will hold the current six-month presidency until 
Latvia takes over in January 2015. Given the limits of such a brief term, the idea of trios was 
formally put forward in 2007. Trios are three countries that hold successive terms that can 
collaborate and discuss common goals to accomplish throughout the 18-month period in 
which one of them holds the presidency. Currently, Italy is collaborating with Latvia and 
Luxembourg. Future research could examine the role of particular presidencies as active or 
passive promoters of AML cooperation.
Findings
Table 1 summarizes the timeline of anti-money-laundering cooperation in Europe 
from 1980 to 2012, showing the creation or adoption date for relevant organizations and 
legislation. These may also be referred to as “actions” in this paper. The color-coding refers 
to the type of actor, or the “action-level”. Light blue refers to United Nations (UN) bod-
ies, yellow refers to the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), green refers to the Council 
of Europe (CoE), and dark blue refers to European Union (EU) bodies. The actions have 
been grouped roughly according to their time of adoption. These groupings have important 
defining characteristics that will be articulated shortly. 
European Integration and Anti-Money Laundering Cooperation
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Source: Author
Table 1. Timeline of anti-money-laundering actions in Europe
Group A consists of only one action, the Council of Europe’s Recommendation on 
measures against the transfer and safekeeping of funds of criminal origin in 1980. This 
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recommendation is not included in Group B because it comes eight years before the next 
action. Although it is an important underpinning of the actions to come, it is in a distinct 
time category and does not appear to directly precipitate immediate action. However, it is 
important to note that the Council of Europe did play a role early in the process. 
Group B consists of the series of actions from 1998 to 1991 that can be characterized 
as the first wave of anti-money-laundering collaboration. The United Nations Convention 
against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, in 1988, appears to 
have precipitated several important actions. First, the Financial Action Task Force was creat-
ed in 1989, and published its first 40 Recommendations, global standards to combat money 
laundering. In the same year, the Council of Europe pushed through a major Convention 
on Laundering, Search, Seizure and Confiscation of the Proceeds from Crime (ETS 141), 
known as the Strasbourg Convention. It is not clear whether the Financial Action Task 
Force or the UN Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic 
Substances prompted the Council of Europe Strasbourg Convention. Yet it is clear that the 
EU was a not a leader in this group. European Union bodies were the last to act, three years 
after the UN Convention and several months after the FATF and CoE actions. 
Group C, from 1996-1997, includes the revision of the Financial Action Task Force 
recommendations and the subsequent creation of new AML units. The United Nations 
Office on Drugs and Crime founded the Law Enforcement, Organized Crime, and Anti-
Money-Laundering Unit in 1997. In September of the same year, the Council of Europe 
launched their Committee of Experts on the Evaluation of Anti-Money Laundering Mea-
sures and the Financing of Terrorism, now known as MONEYVAL. In December, the Eu-
ropean Union followed with a joint action that created a simple mechanism for evaluating 
the application and implementation at the national level of international undertakings in the 
fight against organized crime. A joint action of the Council of the EU is a coordinated ac-
tion of the states involving the deployment of resources to achieve a specific objective. The 
fact that the Council of the EU passed this joint action is evidence that the foreign policy 
ministers of member states had AML on their minds. However, the passing of a joint action 
is not as significant a collaborative accomplishment as is the creation of a new directive, for 
example. 
Group D shows the expansion and implementation of AML practices throughout 
1998. The cut-off point between group C and D is not as obvious as the dividing line be-
tween group B and C. The former groups are only separated by several months, whereas 
groups B and C are separated by five years. However, analyzing the actions that take place 
in 1996 through 1998 as two waves is justifiable because group C sees the creation of new 
units, whereas group D largely consists of less significant actions. As explained above, Joint 
Actions are not as much of a leading step as Directives. The EU is one of the only actors in 
this period, but it seems to be reacting to earlier actions. The Joint Actions refer specifically 
to the FATF 40 Recommendations from 1996 as a reason for their existence. All in all, the 
source of momentum during this time period is unclear. It appears to be a period of expan-
sion and implementation rather than innovation.
Group E, from 1999-2000, consists of a wave of new UN conventions. The fact that 
the adoption dates of the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime and the 
UN convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism are less than a month 
apart demonstrates that there was a strong push within the United Nations for progress on 
transnational criminal issues at the time. Additionally, although the United Nations Con-
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vention against Corruption was not adopted until October 2003, drafting for it began less 
than a year after the other two conventions were adopted. If one looks back at group D, 
one sees that the EU Joint Actions round takes place in the year preceding these UN con-
ventions. However, one cannot infer that the EU joint actions precipitated the UN con-
ventions. A small measure such as a joint action is specific and does not have the visionary 
power to inspire a large convention. The UN leads Group E, in 1999 and 2000. 
Group F shows the post-9/11 shift in emphasis from countering organized crime to 
countering the finance of terrorism (CFT). Although there is a short gap in time between 
the group E and F, there is a major shift in the type of legislation that indicates that there are 
two distinct waves of action from 1999 through 2001. The role of the September 11 attacks 
in 2001 cannot be ignored. The UN Security Council (UNSC) passed Resolution 1373 
on September 28, 2001, which requires the criminalization of terrorism-related activities, 
including the financing of terrorism through money laundering. Although a UNSC resolu-
tion does not require the same breadth of support as a UN convention, Resolution 1373 
shows that the Security Council came to a consensus, no small feat. A month after Resolu-
tion 1373, the Financial Action Task Force substantially revised its recommendations to add 
eight more. Then, in December, the EU adopted Directive 2001/97/EC. This Directive 
amended Council Directive 91/308/EEC on the prevention of the use of the financial sys-
tem for the purpose of money laundering. Although a new directive shows that the EU is 
interested in AML, this move was a response to the new FATF 40 + 8 Recommendations. 
Group G shows a flurry of activity as the FATF revised its recommendations to be-
come the 40 + 9, and, subsequently, the other organizations swiftly revised their own 
legislation, especially after the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) 
published its model legislation. The UN is the most active actor during this period. The 
Security Council passed Resolution 1617, the UN Office on Drugs and Crime re-launched 
its research resource, The International Money Laundering Information Network (IMo-
LIN), and the UNODC published the model legislation. However, UNSC Resolution 
1617 strongly urges the implementation of FATF 40+9, so it is unclear which body was 
the true instigator behind the scenes. Either way, the push came from the international, not 
regional, bodies. The Council of Europe revised its 1990 Strasbourg Convention with the 
express purpose of integrating the FATF 40+9, as opposed to creating a new innovative 
piece of legislation to combat money laundering, for example. 
Finally, group H is the least coherent group. The actions are spread apart and seem to 
be diverging, but the purpose may become clearer in the next few years. The EU passed 
Directive 2008/20/EC amending the implementing powers of the Commission related to 
Directive 2005/60/EC from three years earlier. The UNODC revised its model legislation. 
In 2010, the Council of Europe revised the mandate of The Committee of Experts on the 
Evaluation of Anti-Money Laundering Measures and the Financing of Terrorism (MON-
EYVAL) to turn it into an independent agency to monitor implementation of AML best 
practices and legislation. Finally, in 2012, the Financial Action Task Force revised its 40 + 9 
Recommendations. Although the pattern of action or goal is as yet indiscernible, it is clear 
that anti-money-laundering action and cooperation continue to be important today.
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Conclusions and Future Study
Conclusions
Table 2
Group Leaders of Anti-Money-Laundering Action Waves
Group Date Pattern of Action Leader
A 1980 CoE Basis of AML Council of Europe
B 1988-1991 Basis of AML Legislation UN or FATF
C 1996-1997 New Units FATF
D
1998
Expansion and 
Implementation Unclear
E 1999-2000 New Conventions UN
F Late 2001 Post 9/11 shift to CFT UN
G 2004-2006 40+9 and Revisions FATF or UN
H 2008-2012 Unclear Unclear
Note: 
UN = United Nations
FATF = Financial Action Task Force
Source: Author
Table 2. Group Leaders of Action Waves
In table 2, one can see that the “leader” for a pattern of action within each group is 
overwhelmingly an international actor, whether the United Nations or the Financial Action 
Task Force. Although the precise mechanisms of leadership are debatable, it seems evident 
that the EU comes towards the rear of the pack. The data points to three main conclusions. 
1) The leader may not be clear or constant, but the EU follows international cues. 
2) The Council of Europe is least active, but its actions are significant. 
3) The UN and the FATF seem to lead the way most of the time, although it is unclear 
which is more important. 
First, cooperation across the globe appears to operate in waves, with the EU riding, 
instead of leading, each wave. This may support the realist proposition that EU member 
states would not cooperate heavily on anti-money-laundering, or at least not devote special 
resources to lead the way. It is important to note, however, that the EU rear-guard posi-
tion may be due to other factors, such as specific and lengthy legislative processes. A closer 
look at the initial informal conversations surrounding each action is needed to identity 
the ideological impetus for each action. It is possible that EU bodies or leaders could have 
initiated the actions, but codification took so long that international bodies were able to 
draft legislation more quickly. This could apply in the case of the Financial Action Task 
Force, which has fewer internal political battles. However, much EU legislation explicitly 
references FATF guidelines. Additionally, it seems unlikely that the 193 member states of 
the UN agree upon and implement policy more quickly than the EU’s 28 member states. 
Although the binding quality of EU legislation raises the stakes, the EU member states have 
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the advantage of relative homogeneity (compared to the UN). 
Second, the Council of Europe acts infrequently, but its actions are significant. The 
CoE published the first recommendation dealing with illegal flows of money across borders. 
The Council also passed a convention on the proceeds from crime in 1990, and launched 
MONEYVAL in 1997. However, it only has two actions since 2000 – a new convention 
on money laundering and the launching of MONEYVAL. 
Third, international actors tend to lead the way. The UN and the FATF have the most 
influence, although it is unclear which is more important. The late 1980s saw the creation 
of the basis of most AML legislation, with UN and FATF leadership. Then, new units were 
created under FATF leadership. The UN led a wave of new AML conventions in 1999-
2000, and then another wave post 9/11 that shifted the focus to countering the finance of 
terrorism. Finally, from 2004-2006, the FATF and UN lead the way with the 40+9 and 
other revisions. 
Future Study
To see whether legislation reflects European power politics, further research should 
compare the voting power of EU member states to the rigor of their domestic AML legisla-
tion, since this reflects the importance they give the issue. The model legislation provided 
by the UN Office of Drugs and Crime and the International Monetary Fund would serve as 
an important baseline for structure and content. An interesting question to pursue would be 
whether powerful states are disproportionately affected by money laundering.
A closer look at the timing and political rhetoric surrounding each cooperative break-
through may provide better information. This would require a detailed content analysis of 
each piece of legislation. It might also be well served by an accompanying analysis of the 
political goals of the sponsoring institution at the time. 
Distinguishing between “major” and “minor” actions would add further nuance. Ma-
jor actions require broad consensus and commitment. Small branches of an organization 
might commit a minor action without the support of the full organization. For example, the 
Law Enforcement, Organized Crime, and Anti-Money-Laundering Unit could start a new 
peer-review program, but this does not carry the same weight as a United Nations Conven-
tion approved by the General Assembly and the Security Council. Further research could 
explore whether major actions create a ripple effect among other organizations by sparking 
major or minor actions within those other organizations. 
Future projects should attempt to quantify the importance of legislation and agencies. 
Legislation can also be measured in the frequency of revision and proportion of implemen-
tation among signatories. Agencies can be compared by size, ability to enforce, and budget, 
all of which reflect the importance member states place in them.
Author's Notes
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